Executive Summary For Those That Don’t Want To Read The Entire Thing: My best guess is that that Ukraine is currently trying to fix into place Russian troops in preparation for a break through. I think that Ukraine is trying to make up for their inability to create strategic surprise by fixing the Russians in place with the idea that Ukraine will be able to shift their attack faster than the Russians can react. The new found aggressiveness of Russian air assets are a significant threat to this plan. Ukraine’s only hope is that weak Russian logistics and shortage of quality infantry will enable Ukraine to push through in spite of this threat.

Ukraine’s Weakness:

1. Ukraine has been destroyed as viable nation state on its own. This means Ukraine has no choice but to base military strategy around how they think their allies will respond/what they want as without allied support they will not be functional. Given that Ukraine’s allies are democracies, this means that Ukraine has to stay in the news and to appear to be winning. If they are not in news, nobody will care about them. If they are not winning nobody is going to want to throw good money after bad. This compels Ukraine to adopt an aggressive military strategy regardless of what military logic might otherwise dictate.
2. Ukraine is starting to run into manpower shortages. While on paper they still have plenty of people left to pull into the military, it seems that they are running out of people that are willing to fight. This has not made mainstream news but Ukrainian telegram sources are talking about steps that the government is taking to force people into service. This includes the very “Russian” tactic of grabbing people off the street.
3. Russian has far superior air power to Ukraine. No army in modern history has been successful on the offensive without control of the air with the possible (and arguable) exception of North Vietnam when they finally overran South Vietnam. Ukraine’s only hope is that air defense can make up for not having air power. The problem is this makes a fast breakthrough very difficult as air defense systems take time to break down and re-set up. And while you are doing that, they are not working at protecting your troops. You can try to fix this to a certain extent by pushing your air defenses closer to the front line but this makes them easier to destroy and this may be why we have recently seen a video of a rare (in Ukraine) western radar being destroyed by a Russian drone.
4. Long range strike (cruse missiles) and theater level air defense (Patriots) can make up in part for the above problems. The problem is that Ukraine’s allies cannot be too generous with such systems for fear of China. So while Ukraine seems to be making good use of such systems, they are not even coming close to making up for not having air power. This is why Ukraine has been striving so hard to convince allies to give them planes. But those planes are not going to be arriving anytime soon even if they are eventually given.
5. Ukraine’s troops are poorly trained overall. Much has been made of Ukraine’s troops being “NATO” trained and what not. But the fact is that most of Ukraine’s troops have only been in service for about a year. You don’t create a professional army in one year. Breaching prepared defenses is one of the most difficult things for an army to do. To do it with troops that have little experience will be extremely costly for Ukraine.
6. Russian has prepared a very deep defense of the type that they used to stop the Germans in World War II. Ukraine can break through one line, but there will be another. If they break through that line, there will be another. Ukraine’s only hope for an easy break through is mass panic of the Russia forces.
7. Ukraine’s allies are having trouble keeping it supplied with as much ammunition as they would like. This leaves open the question of how long they can sustain an offensive.

Russia’s Weakness:

1. Russia seems to be sorely lacking in Infantry that will stand in fight. We can see that with the gains that Ukraine is making around Bakhmut. But even in the hard fighting in southern Ukraine it seems as if artillery, mines, and air power are the real problems. As best as I can tell, Russia has burned through the men who wanted to fight and now is relying mostly on people who have little training and are being forced to fight.
2. Ukraine’s artillery is superior to Russian artillery in terms accuracy and effectiveness. Even Russian sources acknowledge this. For awhile, Russia had been making up in quantity what they lacked in quality. But it seems that all the recent western equipment has tilted the scales to point where in areas of high priority to Ukraine they have superiority in terms of artillery fire. That does not mean that Russian artillery is not dangerous, but they seem to be losing the artillery duels in the early days of this offensive and that is a big change from earlier in the war.
3. When using their new equipment, Ukraine now has a strong advantage at night. The mainstream news has been focused on the new Western equipment that has been destroyed. What has been missed in the mainstream news is that the Russians on the front are complaining about how the new equipment gives the Ukrainians a huge advantage fighting at night. Most of the western equipment that has been given to Ukraine does not have more armor or fire power then their Russian equivalent. But what they do have is better sensors and targeting equipment. If Ukraine can keep the equipment from being knocked out by mines or artillery, this will make a big difference when they come to close with the Russians.
4. Russia is having serious problems with equipment and supplies. Their vaunted bottomless stocks are not giving them what they need. The Russians are trying to pretend that they are allowing Ukraine to attack as some kind of wise strategy to kill Ukrainians with the least amount of lost to themselves. But the truth of the matter is that they have tried repeatedly to go on the offensive over the winter and accomplished nothing except in Bakhmut and that was due largely to Wagner. Just because they have failed does not mean the Ukraine will succeed (Word War 1 should show how both sides can get stuck on the defense). But it does show how depleted the Russians have become over the course of this conflict that they can no longer sustain an offense of any meaningful size. Russia’s only hope to regain the initiative is that Ukraine’s allies grow tired of supporting them (admittedly, this is a real possibility).
5. Russian is tittering on the edge of being a failed state both demographically and economically in the same way that Ukraine is no longer a functioning independent nation. But unlike Ukraine, Russia has no allies willing to pay all its bills. This means that while on paper Russia can throw a lot more money and men into the fight then Ukraine, Russia has to be careful to keep its economy functioning. Given that Russia is already struggling with manpower shortages in its economy, this means that Russia has real constraints on its ability to call up more manpower that have nothing to do with fear of of popular opinion. Unless China suddenly decides to become Russia’s sugar daddy, Russian ability to create a bigger force is much more limited then common discussions on this topic acknowledge.
6. Russia elites are divided and prone to infighting in way that Ukraine’s are not (at least at this current time). The most visible example of this in Wagner Vs the Russian Defense Ministry. But the divisions are far more complex than that. There is people who are driven by ideology (various flavors of nationalist mostly), people who are driven by defending their power base without reference to wider goals of the nation (Russian Department of Defense seems to not care if Russia wins or loses as long as they don’t lose power), and people who are concerned by their money (various powerful business interests). This lack of unity in the elites is why Russia is doing things like taking passports away from high ranking government officials and wealthy businessmen. They can control the general population by controlling the TV. But they can’t stop the people who care or who have power/wealth from having sharply differing opinions.
7. Russian is right on the edge of a leadership crisis. Putin is always in the news with people speculating about his health. But the real problem is that Russian top leadership as a whole is very old. There are younger people around, but none of them has the power base to take over. Combine this with existing divisions in the leadership, and Russian is dependent on one old man for its continued operations. This is a vulnerability that Ukraine does not share. If Zelenskiy was to be killed, he would just be martyr and Vitali Klitschko could take over (and I do understand that Klitschko is in the political opposition to Zelenskiy but that shows how different Ukraine is from Russia in that regard. There is no official opposition to Putin that have any positions of power. Even within Zelenskiy own circle there are younger popular people who could take over like Kyrylo Budanov).

So what does this collection of weakness and strengths mean for Ukraine Counter Offensive? I think we can break down this discussion into points that are pretty straightforward and points that are still open questions. The straight forward points are as follows…

1. Ukraine had no choice but to launch this counter attack. As noted they are failed state depending on their allies to stay functioning as a government. If they are not in the news, nobody wants to give them money. If they are not winning, the desire to give them money goes away. This counter attack is thus driven as much by their weakness as it is by their strength. Granted, they would desire to take back their land in any case. But an argument could be made that a slower and more methodical approach then staking it all on one massive counter attack would be better and safer given Russia’s weaknesses. But Ukraine does not have a choice and so this debate is not even being had.
2. Russian currently does not currently have the forces to lunch a successful strategic level attack (as opposed to minor tactical gains like Bakhmut). Russian fan boys in the west are in denial about this fact but most Russian commentators have acknowledge this in one way or another. By extension, this means that Russian has limited means to take advantage Ukraine by attacking in some other spot. After all Russia already could not break through even without Ukraine using the forces they have been keeping in reserves. Now that Ukraine has pulled out the reserves, Russia is going to be under even more stress.
3. Strategic surprise was impossible for Ukraine due to Russian space assets and the likely presence of Russian sympathizers on the ground. This means that Ukraine had no choice but to attack head first into positions that were prepared to receive them.
4. By the same token, Allied intelligence on Russian intentions and equipment has been shown to be very good (to the point that the Russians are griping about it all the time). This means that Russia is unlikely to have secret reserves of forces that Ukraine does not already know about.
5. It is widely reported by both Ukrainian sources and Russian ones that Ukraine has yet to throw all their forces into the battle.

That leaves us with the open questions. The major ones are as follows….

1. Last year, Ukraine told the entire world that they were going to retake the Kherson and then launched a surprise offensive in the Kharkiv region. This was not a surprise in the sense that Russia did not know that those forces were there, but it was a surprise in the sense that Russia was not prepared to deal with a blow there given the focus on Khearson. Given the fact that Ukraine is known to have not committed all their reserves, is a similar plan still in works for this offensive? Last time it worked in part because Russia shifted so much force in the Kherson direction that they could not bring it back as fast as Ukraine could shift their forces with their interior lines. This will be a lot harder to pull off now that Russia has dramatically shortened the front line they have to defend. But some sources are saying that Russia has committed all available reserves to holding back Ukraine in the southern region. If this is so, then Ukraine might have an opportunity to do the same thing they did last time in the eastern region.
2. Since both sides have a good understanding of the force structure of the others, the big unknowns are morale and technical competency. Now that Ukraine is being more aggressive about drafting people into the military will they retain the morale advantage that they have held to date? How much of a difference will the weeks of “NATO” training make compared to the Russia conscripts who got to next to nothing in terms of training? So far the Ukrainian infantry seems to be holding on to their edge but it is early yet. We don’t know the quality of troops that Ukraine has been holding back.
3. What level of success on Ukraine’s part is sufficient to keeping its Allies engaged and will to keep supplying Ukraine with money and weapons? Obviously this question is moot if Ukraine has no success, but what level of success is enough? Given the hype that led up to this, you could be forgiven for thinking that anything short of a march to Moscow would be considered a failure. But what if Ukraine gains and keeps a lot of territory but does not take back all the land they lost. Is that a success or a failure in the eyes of the Allies?

My best guess trying to shift the wheat from the chaff is that Ukraine is trying to fix Russia in place so that they can’t react to a breakthrough. This is the only reason I can see for Ukraine attacking along such a broad front. Russians are chortling about “repelling” so many attacks. But in most cases, it is likely that the Ukrainian goal is just to fix the enemy in place so that a breakthrough can take place.

What is new is that Ukraine seems to have achieved local superiority in artillery along the front they are attacking on. This is the first time I think this has been seen during the course of this war. Given that Ukraine has achieved this without committing all of its forces (according to both Russian and Ukrainian sources) I think Ukraine has a very good chance of creating a breakthrough.

But what I still don’t understand is how a Ukrainian breakthrough will survive Russian air power. One thing that is often forgotten is that Russia air power stopped a couple of Ukrainian breakthroughs in Kherson and prevented them from exploiting their success. It was one of the major reasons why Kherson Offensive was so much more of a slog then the Kharkiv offensive was. Eventually the stress caused by sharply constrained supply lines caused the Russians to leave but they were never routed like they were in Kharkiv. Due to the lack of a river behind Russian lines that can be used as a supply bottleneck, I don’t see that trick working twice.

That said, anyone betting on Russian competence during this war would have lost a lot of money. If there is anyone one who can lose to an offense of poorly trained troops that they knew was coming and had plenty of time to prepare for it is the current Russian leadership. So far the Russians seem to have fired or otherwise suppress any commander or group that has shown any level of success. With that track record, it is possible that they will fall apart as soon as Ukraine achieves a breakthrough and will not be able to effectively use their air power to stop it.

If you are Ukrainian pessimist, the fact that Russian air power is already so active even thought the Ukrainians are still close to their air defense networks is a bad sign. If you are an Ukrainian optimist, the videos of Russian infantry retreating though their own mine fields in a panic shows just how close to collapse the Russian forces are.

Given that I have consistently over estimated the Russians throughout this war, I am going to lean against my natural instincts and bet on a major and sustained loss of Russian held territory as a result of this “offensive”. But intellectually, I don’t understand how the Russians can let that happen with all the current advantages in prepared fortifications and air power that they posses. And I see no chance for this offensive to bring the war to a close. So would this be a success?