Have We Lost the Red Sea?
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Category Archives: Middle East
Iran Just Set the Stage For a Major War
Iran’s Missile Strike on Israel – The attack, defence & Israel’s counter-strike
With what weapons can Israel attack Iran?
Iran vs. Israel: What We Learned and What to Watch For
Nothing special but a good overview for those who have not been reading.
Iran Attacks Israel – Exoatmospheric Intercept of Iranian Missile by Arrow 3!
Combat Vets from Israel Explain Urban Warfare, Drones, Insurgency tactics
Should the US Navy Protect All Commerce?
The below video is full of good information if you have time to listen to it (even though it is a video, you will not miss much by just listening). But in my opinion, it fails to address the complexity of this topic in a realistic way even though all the background information is good. The bottom line is that it is easy for any redneck to give the right answer to the above question. It is harder for people regardless of their education to understand and articulate the costs of that answer.
The root of the problem is that US economy is deeply intertwined with the world wide economy. When a ship got stuck in the Suez canal, the resulting supply chain disruptions were felt by factories in small town America. And that was true even though the issue was resolved relatively quickly and it was mostly non-US ships that were impacted. By the same token, it don’t matter who owns the ships or what they have on them, if the Houthi are impacting shipping, the US is going to feel the pain same as everyone else.
Moreover, these things don’t happen in a vacuum. Some people on the left thinks that this is only happening because of the Israeli conflict and if that goes away this will go away. But once you let something like this go unchallenged, why should other people who care about other topics or even just want to make money not try the same thing? If the Houthi get away with doing this with very little costs, it will encourage others with different goals and locations to do the same thing. In the end, failing to stop the Houthi will very quickly (over a period of years to be sure but that is quickly in my book) move us to the law of the jungle ruling the sea and resulting high costs for world trade.
But the problem is, America is the only nation in the West that is has any plausible ability to deal with this threat. Other nations could solve this problem if they made it a national priority and built up their forces over a period of years but right here and right now America is the only one who can plausible shut the Houthis down (that fact that America has failed to do that has more to do with America being unwilling to do things like massive bombing of population centers then any lack of ability).
This is one thing that video below fails to address. It is true as the video says that historically American has only protected American shipping. But what the video fails to address is that historically lots of other nations were more then capable of protecting their own shipping but no longer can. Even as recently as the 1980s, other nations had navies that enabled them to project power effectively (see the UK and Falklands although that was on the very edge of what they could handle). But it is no longer the case anymore and has not been the case for at least 20 years. This means that the safety of the Western World’s economic lifelines is almost entirely in US hands. Other nations can contribute a ship or two, but they can’t sustain the projection of power needed to deal with things like the Houthi on their own. And it does not matter if some abstract notion of fairness says that other nations should protect their shipping. The fact is that they can’t and US will pay the price for their inability along with everyone else.
This is what drives the Biden administration towards conflict with the Houthi. I don’t think they really want a war and if they do want a war the they are sure going about it in a half ass way. But almost any president or possible future president you can think of would do the same thing. They might do it more competently. They might do it with more gusto. Or they might be even more reluctant. But in the end, most of them would come to the same place because they know the voters don’t want another war in the Middle East and they know the voters will blame them for any economic problems resulting from trade disruption. So the incentive from the American voters themselves is to try to find some kind of half measure that squares the circle. It is hard for democracies to produce leaders capable of making effective hard choices because a hard choice is one that voters are not going to like either way.
In the long run, it don’t matter. Based on current trajectories of the US debt, American will soon be forced to stop funding a Navy that can handle such threats. Sooner or later the law of jungle will come to the seas. The demographic forces that are leading to the demise of the modern world will ensure that nobody is able to pick up the mantle when the US is forced to give it up. That is why on a practical level I think the redneck answer is right all along. Shipping disruptions are coming no matter what. The US will not be able to support the burden of keeping the world order from collapsing for very much longer no matter what. So we might as well start the adaption process sooner rather then later. The Houthi might be doing us a favor to help ease us along on the adaption process to what is going to come anyway.
But it bugs me nonetheless to see the issue addressed solely in terms of legalese or fairness with out an honest reflection on the real costs involved. It is a lot easier to blame Biden then it is to contemplate the nature of the systems that produce people like Biden and guide them towards the choices they make. It is a lot easier to say that “we should not be fighting the Houthi” then it is to say, “we should not be fighting the Houthi even if it means 10% inflation and the occasional empty shelves in the stores.” So most people go down the road of imagining that their preferred course of action has no real cost associated with it.
Some Thoughts On Hezbollah’s Problem
1. There are three things that separate a great general from a poor one. The first and most important is that a great general will want to win above all else, a poor general will want to avoid losing above all else. The second is that a great general will know when time is on his side and when it is not where as a poor general is governed by the mood of the crowd and not by the favor of time. And the lastly, the great general will work well with allies and talented subordinates where is the poor general will be a micromanager who does not understand how to bring people to his side.
2. If Hezbollah has a great general, the current situation in Israel must be giving him a headache. All of his choices are bad. By my definition of a good general, he will choose the path that offers victory no matter how dangerous and ignore any path that merely puts off defeat no matter how safe it seems in the short term. But what path offers victory?
3. If we look purely through the lens of what would give Hezbollah the most power, the victory for Hezbollah must be the destruction of Israeli military power. Currently no other regional actor has the power to constrain Hezbollah. The Lebanon’s government is no match for it. The Syrian government is too weak to counter it even if it wanted to. Jordan would be hard pressed to take on Hezbollah alone if it ever came to that. Only Israel could credibly threaten Hezbollah. In other words, even if you throw ideology aside and imagine that institutions are at their core guided by the desire to maximize their own power, Hezbollah has every reason to want to see Israel severely weakened or destroyed.
4. Granting point #3, is this the right time for Hezbollah to try to weaken or destroy Israel? This is not a question of whether Hezbollah “can” destroy Israel or not. Great generals always go for victory even it if seems impossible. Rather, the question if time is on Hezbollah side or not. If Hezbollah will be stronger in a year or two then a great general would wait a year or two. But if Israel will be stronger in a year or two then a great general would strike now regardless of the risks.
5. In the abstract it would be better for Hezbollah to wait for a year or two. Hezbollah has put a lot of work (and rumor has it, suffered a lot of causalities) ensuring that Syria remains ruled by an ally. For the most part it appears that it has succeeded in this goal but Syria is still a wreck. It would benefit Hezbollah if the Syrian state could be given a chance to grow back into a semblance of its former power. Much has been made of Hezbollah’s growing strength but this has been counterbalanced by the great fall in Syria’s power. Back when Hezbollah was weaker, it could count on Syrian help. Now Hezbollah is mighty and has more effective power then Syria but it can’t count on any effective help from Syria. It would benefit Hezbollah to have a stronger Syria to help out Hezbollah.
6. But now Hamas has made its play, can Hezbollah afford to let Israel destroy Hamas? There is always the risk that a newly paranoid Israel will turn on Hezbollah after destroying Hamas. If this is a possibility maybe it would be better attack Israel while Hamas is still in the game.
7. A deeper problem for Hezbollah stems from the nature of its power. Hezbollah’s core strength stems from the fact that it can rally lots of people who are willing to die for it. This is why Hezbollah’s enemies fear them and why their allies give them lots of weapons and money. But this is a double edge sword. Groups whose source of power is money or great numbers can withstand a loss of respect because money and numbers are a source of power all by themselves. But if Hezbollah loses respect, will people still be willing to die for it?
8. In other words, losing respect is an existential threat for Hezbollah. And if Hezbollah does nothing while Hamas is destroyed, it is hard to see how they will not lose respect.
9. Another problem is that Hamas attack has temporarily rallied Israel’s allies. There is a chance that full on Hezbollah attack would bring the US into the fight on Israel side. Is the pain of fighting Israel and the US worth saving Hamas for (who after all are similar in ideology to the people that Hezbollah has been fighting in Syria)?
10. But what is more deadly to Hezbollah, US bombs or losing respect? All of its prestige and support is based around being an effective counter to Israel (or at least, more effective then all the alternatives). Whatever the US does to Hezbollah, it will only increase the respect that Hezbollah has. On the other hand, respect does not do you any good if you no longer have a functioning organization. So can Hezbollah survive the wrath of the US and Israel in enough of functional form to take advantage of this respect?
11. It is true that the US might join in if Hezbollah attacks Israel. But it is unlikely that they will do anything beyond bomb. Hezbollah is used to getting bombed by Israel and what is the US likely to do that Israel has not already done in that regard? Is it really possible for Israel to occupy southern Lebanon and Gaza at the same time like it has in the past? Demographics have been marching on and not in Israel’s favor. That said, a desperate Israel with US support would be deadly. It is an Israel that is off the leash that is more likely to inflict real damage then American air power. But Israel has already tried to take on Hezbollah twice and Hezbollah has only grown stronger. Why should this time be any different?
12. The fundamental problem for Hezbollah is that the fundamentals of good generalship are all mixed up in this fight. There are lots of good reasons for them to want to wait (need to rebuild Syria, the fact that demographics are on their side, the fact that the US is waiting in the wings) but lots of reasons for them to feel compelled to join in (the fact that they can’t rule out that Israel would turn on them after Hamas regardless of what they do and the fact that even if Israel did not do that they would lose respect for sitting the fighting out). A good general does not let the crowd tell him what to do but the respect of the crowds is the core of Hezbollah’s strength and a good general does not disregard the pillars of his strength. So since a good general desires victory above all else, what would a good general do with these conflicting demands?
13. On the balance, I think that a great Hezbollah general would wait until Israel seems maximally committed to Gaza before attacking with full strength. This would make it harder for Israel to just contain Gaza and focus on Hezbollah and it would ensure that there was maximum reason for the world at large to be horrified by what happens when you send a conscript army into an urban area. The goal would be to inflict so much economic damage on Israel that it would not be able to recover from it. At the same time the hope would be that the prestige and support for such an act would help Hezbollah repair its own damage in record time after the war was over.
14. The above presumes that Hezbollah is an independent actor and has a good general. As for the independent actor part, I think it has about as much independence from Iran as Israel does from the US. That is to say, Iran has a lot of influence but is not as controlling as many think. As for Hezbollah having a great general, I don’t know. But throughout my life time it has been growing in power compared to Israel. Hezbollah’s main set back has been Israel’s other enemies have been getting steadily weaker. Syria is no longer a threat to Israel and Egypt is dependent on charity to avoid descending into mass starvation. This means that even though Hezbollah is stronger than it has ever been, it has less chance of anyone coming to its aid than ever before. The one small bright spot has been the fact that Hamas has been growing more effective. That only sharpens the question if Hezbollah can afford to watch them get knocked out.
15. On the other paw, Hezbollah’s leaders are human. And they have to know whatever the abstract calculations are; there is a good chance they or people they care about will die if they take war to Israel. The gloves will come off and it will be very bloody on both sides. Maybe this human fear for their own lives will keep them out of the conflict. But if it does, and Israel succeeds in more or less wiping out Hamas then Hezbollah will be weakened by the resulting loss of respect. And so the question will be, can an organization like Hezbollah that depends on people being willing to give up their lives for it survive a loss of respect?
Netanyahu: We are at war.
Hamas has over run some of Israel’s military bases. Entire families and car loads of Israeli civilians have been slaughtered in the most brutal surprise attack on the Sabbath when many Israelis were celebrating. Hostages have been taken.
A lot of the main points to come out so far are in the above link. The only thing missing are videos showing them shooting up civilians in communities that Hamas has overrun. Those are on telegram but most other sites will not touch them for obvious reasons. You can see some discussion of them here with out images but documenting where they happened.
Iran of course is saying they support this but strangely Hezbollah has not joined in. Makes me wonder if Hamas did not cook this all up on their own.
Edit: Images and Videos were circulating earlier which showed a number of Women being Paraded through Gaza some appearing to only be as Young as 10 and all having been Severely Beaten. I have seen one and it was enough.