A while back Trump was praising himself for the increased spending by NATO countries that has happened during and after his time in office. Just to make sure he got a lot of air time, he threw in a gratuitous comment about how he would not defend and in fact encourage Russia to attack NATO countries that did not pay their fair sure. Predictably, this worked like a charm and all the shrieking Karens went around talking about what a bad man he was and how horribly irresponsible he was.

All they accomplished by all this caterwauling was to further convince the poorer economic classes that Trump was their man. All your working class people heard in all that screeching was a defense of NATO free riding on the poor working class taxpayer. And why should they pay for the defense of those effete snobs when the border is wide open and food prices are sky high?

Those attacking Trump fell right into a trap. Even the supporters of NATO acknowledge that many NATO members have been free loading off of the US. The dwindling military abilities of most NATO members has been a serious concern for serious military thinkers in the West for a long time now. And what has American’s feckless leadership class done about the issue all this time?

Contrary to Trump, I think the improvement on this front (slight as it has been) has more to do with Putin then Trump. But this quibbling about small details is not a productive way to counter Trump. Especially when any fair-minded review of recent history will show that while serving as president Trump brought more attention and pressure to bear on this issue than any other President in the post cold-war era. I think he did this mostly because his strategy is the find the weak points in the ruling classes that shun him and hammer them for all they are worth then him having an particular strategic concerns. Nonetheless, the fact remains that he did more on the issue then his contemporaries.

The below video gives a pretty fair overview of the situation including quoting Trump in all his glory….

Regardless of what you think about the above facts, those running around outraged by what Trump has said are doing nothing to improve the national discourse. But those running around being outraged by the ruling class are not doing any better either. All too often their arguments boil down to simply repeating that the ruling class is stupid and corrupt and trying to imply that all the problems with the world would be so much better as long as their messiah was made president. What is missing is people trying to explain the issues and facts involved. What is missing is people arguing about an issue instead of personalities. And that is where Republican Representative Mike Turner has taken steps to improve the situation. Continue reading →

Below are three minor points relating to the war in Ukraine. The first is noting the surprising effectiveness of Ukraine recent drone campaign. The second is discussing the latest Ukrainian political drama. And the last point is observing experience in Ukraine suggests that maybe the US Marine war gamers had good insights into the future of conventional warfare.

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It annoys me when people bounce around from thinking Ukraine is losing to thinking that Ukraine is winning based on short term factors. But my last post on the “One New Aspect of Warfare That The War In Ukraine Has Revealed” could have appeared to fall into the same trap of group think and going with the prevailing winds. Currently it is quite fashionable to be pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances due to short term issues and my post on long range fires (a military term I am appropriating and using to cover more systems then the US military typically does) could be seen as contributing to it. So to correct that unbalance let me elaborate on a throwaway line in my last post where I said “The West can easily give the long range tools to Ukraine to cause Russia a lot of pain but then they have to worry about Russia going to nukes.”

In absolute terms, the Russian strategic position is extremely weak. To be sure, if you measure Ukraine alone against Russia, Russia has the advantage. But Ukraine was a basket case before Russia invaded so saying they have the advantage does not mean much. I predicated that Russia would fall apart years back and nothing that has occurred since then has caused me to think that prediction was wrong. It remains one of my biggest fears.

People who are gloomy about the future of the West as I am often seem to fall into the trap of thinking that the West’s enemies are better off. But that just goes to show how much their view of the world is based on mood affiliation and not on facts. Some enemies of the West are worst off then the West is and Russia is certainly in this category. One of my biggest fears in the near term is what the collapse of Russia would mean for me and those I care about. In this fear, the ruling class of the West and I have a lot in common and that is why they don’t really want to see Ukraine win.

I am not going to go into detail in this post about all the long time term factors that make me expect the collapse of the Russian state (although I will note that in Russia’s case it is even worse than the lack of babies). Instead, I want to make a simple point about how the logic of my post about the new nature of long term precision fires means that Russia is a hair’s breadth from losing this war overnight. The only thing that is keeping them in the game is the West’s fear of their nuclear weapons. But West’s calculations about what they can get away with are constantly changing. All that has to happen is for their perspective to change slightly and Russia will have face the choice of complete collapse or getting out the big bombs.
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An often remarked aspect of the War in Ukraine has been how much the battlefield looks like World War 1. Trenches and mines have been revealed to be very effective just as they have always been. They are effective not because they can’t be beat, but because the cost of beating them is all out of proportion to the cost of making them. It cost next to nothing dig a trench or make a mine, but to defeat a trench or remove a mine is a very expensive deal.

From what I can tell, short range consumer grade drones have only reinforced that logic. I think this is because the attackers have to move away from their electronic warfare assets and towards the enemies electronic warfare assets. Since range impacts how effective electronic warfare is, this means the attacker is moving to a place where his drones are less effective and the enemies drones are more effective. When you add that to the fact that people and equipment on the move are more vulnerable to drone attacks and the defenders advantage is only reinforced.

That is why I don’t think all the talk about short range drones changing warfare is really correct. It has been a truism in military thought that the defenders have the advantage since at least von Clausewitz wrote “On War”. All short range consumer type drones are doing is reinforcing something about war that we all take for granted. The defender has an advantage.

But all the talk about stalemate and how World War 1 has come again has obscured the big change in warfare that has made it so that the attacker has the clear advantage. Continue reading →

1. I think it is safe to say that Ukraine’s offensive has failed politically. Every victory that Ukraine achieved resulted in a boast of support as people on the western street thought that if their country just threw more money at Ukraine they could feel like they were part of the winning sports team (speaking cynically). The lack of news worthy progress has led to a falling off of the desire to give more money to Ukraine all around the world on the part of the everyday Joe.

2. In one sense, Ukraine’s failed offensive is a victory for Russia. Russia seemed determined to make sure that Ukraine had no territorial gains to boast about like they had in the past and they succeeded in that goal. But this goal was archived by experiencing more losses then Ukrainians even though the Russians were on the defensive. As best I can tell, this is because Russia would frantically counterattack anytime they lost ground or even looked like they were losing ground. Moreover, it seems that Russia forced people to stand and die long past the point of their being any military benefit as conventionally understood.

3. In spite of Russia’s bloody minded determination, Ukraine did succeed in creating a small bridgehead into Russia’s defensive lines. Looking at that bridge head on a map, and it looks like the perfect place for Russia to do a pincer attack and put the Ukrainian forces into a pocket or force them to withdraw. But Russia seems to be making no attempt to do this. I am guessing that this is because local Ukrainian artillery superiority prevents them from maneuvering the types of forces needed to do this.

4. Instead, Russia seems to have decided to try to make a surprise attack to take Avdiivka. In once sense this is understandable. If the first surprise attack had worked, it might have been worth it and certainly Ukraine has made similar attempts/errors. But the doubling down and continuing to send columns after columns of armored fighting vehicles to their deaths is truly mind blowing. The conventional wisdom at the moment seems to be that there is no way the Russians can take Avdiivka. I am not sure about that. Russian’s proved at Bakhmut that they can outlast losses that western analysts think should stop them. But by the same token, the price of Bakhmut was the destruction of Wagner as an effective fighting force and the first armed munity of the war. On top of that, Russia gained no discernible strategic advantage from taking Bakhmut. If Russia truly commits to taking Avdiivka at “any cost” it seems likely that the price they will pay will be even greater then what they paid for Bakhmut and it is not clear what advantage they would get from it in a strategic sense.

5. Overall, it seems that Russia failed to use this year to rebuild their combat power. Whatever they managed to accumulate seems to have gotten thrown into one front or another. New equipment has been showing up at the front so we know they are still making stuff. But the overall quality of the equipment in the Russia army seems to be going down. This seems to indicate that they can’t keep up with the losses they are suffering.

6. Russian fiscal situation is deteriorating. It is hard to tell how badly because they have stopped the release of a lot of information. But they are doing a lot of bizarre things like jacking up interest rates and imposing currency controls even though in theory they don’t have inflation. It is obvious that they are struggling to control the value of the ruble (down in value by about 25% since the start of the war) but this does not explain why they felt compelled to restrict the exports of diesel (which depressed the value of the ruble). It seems by their own figures that revenue is down this year by about 70% compared to pre war figures and they are likely to be close to two trillion dollars in the hole by the end of the year when extra war expenses are taken into account. In spite of all this, Russia does not seem to be depleting it foreign exchange reserves to any great extent even if you only count those that are not frozen. So I remain confused as to just how bad it is for them at the moment beyond the obvious fact that is worse than it was before the war started.

7. A lot of the success of Russian strategy this year will come down to if Biden can get his large aid package for Ukraine through congress. In the end, it does not matter if the average Joe on the street is losing interest if Ukraine keeps getting weapons and ammo. Biden’s package is geared to fund Ukraine through the next election. If Biden gets his package through, then the Russians excessive losses to prevent Ukraine from gaining ground will have all been a waste. It is unlikely that if Ukraine had gained a few hundred extra square miles it would have resulted in a bigger aid package then Biden is trying to give them. But by not being so frantic in the counter attacks and allowing Ukraine to gain more ground, Russia would have allowed Ukraine to spread its own troops out more and preserved more of its own forces to be rebuilt into something effective.

8. Russian military history is full of examples defeats and long defensive campaigns leading to victory. Russian military history is also full of disasters caused by Russian corruption and refusal to adapt to changing circumstances. This current war looks a lot more like the latter.

9. Ukraine is done demographically as nation no matter how long this war takes. And it can’t sustain this war on its own. But as long as the west is willing to fund it, it looks able to keep fighting effectively for another year yet at least. It is true that it is increasingly having to force people to join the army but that has been true of Russia for awhile and not a sign that Ukraine is about to collapse manpower wise. That said, it is a reminder that Ukraine is going down the drain manpower wise but there is a long way to go down that road before Ukraine stops fielding effective military forces.

10. Russian had hoped that the fighting in Israel would pull support away from Ukraine. But Biden (or his handlers) are shrewdly tying aid for Ukraine to aid for Israel and Taiwan and he is trying for a one and done approach so he does not have to come back asking all the time. Since Biden only needs some Republican support to make this work, it is likely to be successful although Republican hardliners are likely to try all kinds of parliamentary style delaying tactics using the rules that are available. And for the most part, the types of military aid that the two nations need will not overlap. Israel does not need tanks or long range strike missiles and Ukraine does not really need the bombs and air to ground missiles because it lacks an air force that can get close to the Russians. The main pinch point will be ballistic missile interceptors (assuming Hezbollah gets involved) as the US also has to worry about China in that regard as well as everything else. Artillery shells will also be an issue as although Israel is unlikely to use much (historically they have relied on their Air Force), anything they do use will really hurt Ukraine as they already have a shortfall in shells. One unknown is how much Iran help to Russia would be impacted by the needs of their proxy forces for things like drones….

The Bottom Line:

I expect that Ukraine will get what they need to fight for another year and I expect they will continue to fight effectively (i.e. in way that is very painful for the Russians). What I don’t have a good understanding of is how well Russia will endure another year of such fighting. It seems that they are starting to feel the fiscal effects and are struggling to maintain an effective military but Russian history has proved they can keep going for a long time in situations where other nations would become demoralized. On the other hand, where other nations tend to pull back before they collapse, Russia has many times pushed past that point……